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Abstract
Background: Due to the high number of immunosuppressed and other predisposed patients
hospitals have to control and ensure the microbiological water quality. The origin for the
occurrence of pathogenic microorganisms in water pipes is the formation of biofilm.
Methods: For the permanent control of water safety a water safety plan (WSP) was realized as
recommended by the WHO following the principle "search and destroy". The WSP is based on an
established HACCP concept due to the special focus. The most important measures include the
concept for sample taking depending on patient risk. 3 different categories) are distinguished: risk
area1 (high infection risk), risk 2 (moderate infection risk), and risk area 3 (not increased infection
risk). Additionally to the threshold value of the German law for the quality of drinking water
(TrinkwV) three more limiting values were defined (warning, alert, and worst case) for immediate
risk adapted reaction. Additional attention has to be focussed on lavatory sinks, which are an open
bacterial reservoir. Therefore continuous disinfecting siphons were installed as part of the WSP in
high risk areas.
If extended technical equipment is not available, especially for immunocompromised patients the
following measures are easy to realize: boiled (or sun exposed) water for nursing procedures as
well alimentary use, no showering.
Results: Comparing data over 3 years the microbial water quality was significantly improved
resulting in no new case of nosocomial Legionella pneumoniae and decrease in neonatal sepsis.
Conclusion:  According to average situations with highly contaminated water system the
management must be defined with implementation of water task force, immediate providing of
special equipment, information of patients and staff and control of the water quality, an example
for successful decontamination of the hospital within 24 hours is given.
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Background
The coherence between contaminated water and nosoco-
mial infections are still a common problem in the clinical
routine [1]. The dominating pathogens are Legionella
pneumophila [2] and Pseudomonas aeruginosa [3], while i.e.
Aeromonas spp., Flavobacterium spp., atypical Mycobacteria
(Mycobacteria other than tuberculosis = MOTT) [4,5], H.
pylori [6], Acanthamoeba [7], Cryptosporidia [8], Amoe-
bae i.e. Naegleria [9], Viruses [10], Shigella [9], Salmonella
spp., EHEC and moulds like Aspergillus fumigatus [11,12]
and fusarium [13] are found less frequently. There are
additionally epidemic agents in developing countries like
Vibrio cholerae, Entamoeba histolytica and Salmonella typhi
[9].
Due to the high number of immunosuppressed or other
endangered patients in hospitals, the requirements on the
microbiological quality of the drinking water are much
higher than in domestic area. The occurrence of patho-
genic microorganisms in water pipes is caused by biofilms
[1,14,15]. These biofilms arise not only in older but also
in newly opened hospitals mostly due to stagnation [16].
Further attention has to be focussed on lavatory sinks,
containing up to 105 to 1010 cfu/ml of bacteria, thereof
about 103 to 106 cfu/ml of gramnegative rods [17].
For prevention of nosocomial waterborne infections a
structured quality management and sufficiently operating
security system has to be established. In 2004, the WHO
published the 3rd guidelines for drinking water quality rec-
ommending the introduction of a water safety plan
(WSP). It has to include control and preventive measures,
based on a multiple-barrier approach and the HACCP
(hazard analysis and critical control points) concept [18].
The permanent surveillance of the microbiological water
quality as well as the realization of the WHO guidelines is
the aim of our efforts for the introduction and evaluation
of the WSP for a hospital of maximum care.
Methods
Realization of the HACCP concept in routine
CCP and CP were introduced by identification of micro-
biological, chemical and physical risks and the definition
of concrete points of threat (control points; at least every
fact which has an influence on the water quality) and
points of steering (critical control points; threats which
offer the possibility of exerting influencing control and
avoidance of risks). Both are considered under two situa-
tions: routine (figure 1) and critical contamination (figure
2).
CP and CCP in routine Figure 1
CP and CCP in routine.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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The following critical control points (CCP) were defined:
￿ CCP 1 incoming temperature in the warm water system
at least ≥ 60°C
￿ CCP 2 monthly thermal disinfection of the warm water
system at a temperature of 73°C for at least 10 min
￿ CCP 3 concentration of disinfecting agents for the chem-
ical disinfection at point of entrance and taps; limiting
values according to the German law for the quality of
drinking water (TrinkwV 2001) have to be maintained
￿ CCP 4 compliance of the temperature-time relation
according to thermal disinfection in case of positive
Legionella results in the water
￿ CCP 5 compliance of limiting values after chemical
decontamination at the outlets
￿ CCP 6 changing frequency of point of use (POU) filters
￿ CCP 7 surveillance of the processing of POU filters
The following control points (CP) were detected:
￿ CP 1 transgression of microbiological limiting values
￿ CP 2 water inlet in the pipeline system of the hospital
￿ CP 3 handling and processing of the aerators
￿ CP 4 scalding risk at thermal disinfection including out-
lets
As a result of the definition of CP and CCP the redevelop-
ment and basic decontamination of the water pipe system
was the first preventive measure. Rarely used taps and
dead ends were detected and removed. Concrete measures
to be performed in case of exceeding 80% of the legal
defined limit value of 100 cfu/ml were predetermined (so-
called warning value, table 1). The intention behind this
sub-set limit value is the prevention of critical contamina-
tion.
The following measures were established:
￿ ≥ 80 cfu/ml in the immediate sample after opening the
tap as sign for local contamination, but no pathogens:
processing of the aerators
CP and CCP during the process of decontamination Figure 2
CP and CCP during the process of decontamination.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Table 1: Definition of extended microbiological thresholds according to the risk areas
Risk area Parameter Warning* Threshold Alert* Worst case*
1 and 2 TMC 22°C and 36°C 80 – 100 CFU/ml >100 CFU/ml** >200 – 500 CFU/ml >500 CFU/ml
Coli-like, E. coli, Enterococci 0 CFU/100 ml** 1–10 CFU/100 ml >10 CFU/100 ml
P. aeruginosa 0 CFU/100 ml** 1–10 CFU/100 ml >10 CFU/100 ml
Legionella spp.(shower, tap) 0 CFU/100 ml* 1–100 CFU/100 ml >100 CFU/100 ml
fungi 0 CFU/100 ml* 10–100 CFU/100 ml >100 CFU/100 ml
3 TMC 22°C and 36°C >100 CFU/ml** >500 CFU/ml >1000 CFU/ml
Coli-like, E. coli Enterococci 0 CFU/100 ml** 1–10 CFU/100 ml >10 CFU/100 ml
P. aeruginosa 0 CFU/100 ml** 1–50 CFU/100 ml >50 CFU/100 ml
Legionella spp.(shower) 0 CFU/100 ml* >5–50 CFU/100 ml >50 CFU/100 ml
Legionella spp. (tap) 0 CFU/100 ml* >200 CFU/100 ml >500 CFU/100 ml
*our in-house recommendation ** law(2001) resp. water quideline (2004)
￿ cfu ≥ 80 cfu/ml after 3 min of running as indicator for
central contamination, but no pathogens: flooding of
water system, control, if still positive (> 100 cfu/ml), ClO2
decontamination (6 ppm 1 h)
￿ Pseudomonas spp. in 100 ml: temporarily installation of
POU filters in risk areas until decontamination
￿ Legionella spp. in 100 ml: POU resp. closing of showers
until decontamination, permanent heating level of 60°C
in the hot water system, additionally monthly thermo dis-
infection of hot water system including all outlets perma-
nent installation of point of use (POU) filters in risk
wards as well as for the last washing cycle for endoscope
instruments. The heating up minimal to 73°C for at least
10 min is necessary for killing intra-amoeboid Legionella
[19]. In case of contamination of the cold water system
the same procedure is realized.
Realization of the HACCP concept in case of water 
stagnation (i.e. reconstructed or new buildings)
In case of stagnation, i.e. during times of reconstruction of
elder or new building under construction the following
measures are executed:
￿ Flushing of the water system beginning 4 weeks before
opening
￿ Parallel water sampling
￿ If flushing is not sufficient; decontamination depending
on the microbial burden and the risk assessment
Realization of the HACCP in case of emergency
The task force water safety releases immediate measures in
case of contamination:
￿ No withdrawal of water until the end of decontamina-
tion
￿ Avoid hand washing as far as possible; prefer disinfec-
tion
￿ If hand washing is necessary, disinfect the hands subse-
quently, or use filtrated water (POU filter)
￿ Use heated water (≥ 73°C 10 min) for washing the
patients
￿ Showering is forbidden during the hole process of sani-
tation
￿ Water for brushing teeth has to be taken from fountains
or mineral water bottles
￿ Contaminated water may not be used for cleaning sur-
faces near to patients
￿ All outlets in working areas have to be equipped with
POU filters.
The process of decontamination is executed during the
night shift. Staffs needs to be informed about the meas-
ures, every ward has a responsible employee. The first step
is the de-installation and processing of all aerators. After-
wards the hot water system is heated up to a temperature
of ≥ 73°C for at least 10 min, starting when achieving tar-
get temperature at the most distant outlet. The cold water
system is decontaminated with ClO2(10 ppm). The con-
centration is checked at the most distant outlet just as in
the hot water system. When achieving the default concen-
tration, the acting time of 1 h begins. Afterwards the loss
of chlorine is determined, if loss is more than 50 %, the
process needs to be repeated. The whole water system isBMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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flushed until a concentration of ≤ 0.2 ppm ClO2  is
attained. Machines, like drinks dispenser, with connec-
tion to the drinking water system are disconnected before.
Implementation of a microbiological control program and 
predetermined measures
According to the German drinking water ordinance
(TrinkwV 2001) the drinking water must be examined for
the indicator organisms Coli-like, E. coli, Heterotrophic
plate count (HPC) in cold water at 22°C and 36°C and
Legionella spp. in water > 21°C once a year. Further con-
trols were introduced basing on risk assessment: Risk area
1 (high infectious risk), risk area 2 (moderate infectious
risk), risk area 3 (infectious risk not increased). The fre-
quency of controls is 3, 2 resp. 1 per year (table 2).
SOP's were introduced for water sampling and processing
of the samples steered by a sampling plan. The sampling
is performed immediately after opening the tap and after
3 min running. The microbiological diagnostic follows
national recommendations [20-24], while Legionella is
determined in 1000 ml water instead of 100 ml recom-
mended by the Federal Environmental Office (Umwelt-
bundesamt)
In risk area 1 permanent pathogen-free water is required.
Because permanent supervision is impossible single-use
or reprocessable point of use (POU filters) are provided.
Filters are automatically reprocessed in a washer disinfec-
tor at the certified university-own Central Sterile Supply
Department and finally dryed at 115°C with sterile fil-
trated air. For safe handling (touching and cleaning is pro-
hibited, changing frequence is 4 resp. 8 weeks) a hygienic
information sheet was deposited at all places of usage.
Additionally the self disinfecting siphons BioRec®
(BIOREC UmweltBioTechnologie& BioRecycling-Systeme
Lauta, Germany), which acting by self-heating, antimicro-
bial coated, and emitting ultrasound, to prevent the emis-
sion of aerosols [17], were installed in risk area 1.
The extended limiting values beside the limiting value
(according to the TrinkwV) are the warning value, the
alert, and worst case value, based on a risk assessment
(table 1).
Table 3 gives an overview measures that were established.
The documentation for the WSP includes information
about the ward, the isolated strain and content of cfu/ml,
characteristics of the location (i.e. cold or warm water sys-
tem; shower, tap) and the date of sample taking and pro-
vides information about performed measures (table 3).
Formation of the task force "water safety"
To ensure the interdisciplinary cooperation of all respon-
sible persons the task force water safety was introduced
under direction of the head of the Institute of Hygiene and
Environmental Medicine (IHEM), including two infection
control nurses, experts of the institute of microbiology,
Table 2: Allocation of the different facilities according to the risk assessment
Risk area Clinic Ward/Department
1 POU filter anaesthesia and intensive medicine ICU
gynecology delivery room-birth tub
otorhinolaryngology water for processing of endoscops
internal medicine ICU, hematology-oncology
pediatrics milk kitchen, Hematology/Oncology, ICU, Processing of 
incubators
2 anaesthesia and intensive medicine weaning
surgery intermediate care
gynecology senology-breast center
otorhinolaryngology radiol. ward
internal medicine cardiologic monitoring ward
oral and maxillofacial surgery Recovery room
nuclear medicine ward
neurorehabilitation all wards/divisions
3 anaesthesia and intensive medicine stroke unit
ophtalmology all wards
surgery, gynecology, dermatology otorhinolaryngology all other wards
internal medicine dialysis, nephrology, gastroenterology, endocrinology, admission 
ward, cardiology, emergency
pediatric surgery, oral and maxillofacial surgery, pediatrics, 
neurosurgery neurology, orthopedics, urology
all other wards
center for dentistry all divisions
hospice wardB
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Table 3: the different schemes in case of exceeding microbiological limit values for risk and non-risk areas
Risk area Parameter Warning Threshold Alert Worst case
1 POU filter
2 CFU/1 ml 22°C, 36°C inspection, inspection, flushing, POU filter, meeting of taskforce water safety, meeting of taskforce water safety, stop of 
withdrawal,
flushing, control within 1 day, Inspection, disinfection,
control within 3 days If negative → finish use of POU filter Flushing,
If still positive → disinfection disinfection, POU filter, control within 1 day
P. aeruginosa, inspection, POU filter, meeting of task force water safety,
Legionella spp., flushing, control within 1 d, stop of withdrawal or POU filter, disinfection,
E. coli Enterococci, if negative → finish use of POU filter control within 1 day,
fungi if still positive → disinfection If negative → withdrawal allowed with POU for 
5d,
parallel water sampling
3 CFU/1 ml 22°C, 36°C inspection, flushing, control within 3 
days,
meeting of task force water safety, flushing,
If still positive → disinfection, disinfection,
flushing, control within 1 day
control within 7 d
P. aeruginosa, inspection, meeting of task force water safety,
Legionella spp., POU filter, flushing, control within 1 
day, if negative → finish POU usage
stop of withdrawal or POU filter,
E. coli, if still positive → disinfection if negative →
Enterococci, release of withdrawal and POU for 5d, parallel 
water sampling
fungiBMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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hospital hygiene-supervising physicians from the differ-
ent facilities and the department of engineering. The
department of health of the city of Greifswald (DHC) sup-
ports our measures as external quality control authority.
Results
In 2004 very high concentrations of micro-organisms
occurred in a new opened part of the hospital. The depart-
ment of health (DHC) had declared negative water probes
within three month before the opening. Own controls at
the day of official opening showed P. stutzeri at a concen-
tration of 2.3 × 105 cfu/100 ml. The task force water safety
initiated all measures now established in the WSP. The
whole process of decontamination lasted at least 6 hours
and took place during the night shift. All aerators were de-
installed, processed and disinfected; the cold water system
was decontaminated with 10 ppm ClO2 for one hour, fol-
lowed by 0.2 ppm ClO2 over one week. The hot water sys-
tem was heated up to 73°C for minimum 10 minutes.
Water samples after sanitation until today indicated no
further contamination.
To evaluate the efficacy of the WSP the microbiological
results were recorded from May 2004 to April 2006. Figure
3 shows the number of examinations (by means of com-
parability of ratios inspections are normalized to 100).
The total numbers for 2004 were 56 inspections, 19 1st, 9
2nd and 1 3rd re-inspection, in 2005 respectively 78 inspec-
tions, 57 1st, 11 2nd and no 3rd re-inspection and 2006
finally 94 inspections, 20 1st, 4 2nd and 1 3rd re-inspection.
Figure 4 gives an overview about performed measures; Fig-
ure 5 the maintenance of limiting values.
To demonstrate the outcome of the performed measures
inspections by the DHC in 2005 provide a basis for con-
sidering their outcome. In total 21 inspections were per-
formed in risk area 1, 28 in risk area 2 and 89 in risk area
Course of the number of inspections by the IHU comparing the three years of the survey Figure 3
Course of the number of inspections by the IHU comparing the three years of the survey.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Development of the compliance of results according to the limiting values of the TrinkwV in the three risk areas (surveillance  of IHEM) Figure 4
Development of the compliance of results according to the limiting values of the TrinkwV in the three risk areas (surveillance 
of IHEM).
3. Figure 6 to 9 express the microbiological results of the
examinations by the DHC. There were only few com-
plaints, mostly due to local contamination.
Discussion
The first step for the introduction of a WSP is the revision
of infrastructural failures regarding the possibility of a cer-
tain contamination. Therefore the infrastructure of the
water system was analyzed and dead ends and rarely used
taps were eliminated as far as possible in the elder parts of
the hospital. These experiences were also adopted for the
design of buildings now under construction. Those tech-
nical respectively infrastructural failures can result in
extensive additional costs or even temporarily closure of
parts of the clinical complex. Furthermore there are lots of
other infrastructural conditions affecting the water qual-
ity. Leprat et al. [25] identified i.e. non-touch fittings as
another special source of Pseudomonas aeruginosa and
Legionella spp. We experienced wetting of those fittings
during construction followed by stagnation as main rea-
son of contamination. Therefore press-fittings now have
to be moistened with water of proven drinking water qual-
ity to avoid a contamination.
To permanently ensure the water quality in high-risk areas
terminal POU filters were established in risk area 1
[1,26,27]. The current number of POU filters in the clini-
cal complex of the University of Greifswald is 63 at round
about 900 beds. The annual costs therefore add up to
€60,000. Except for the ethic aspect the costs of a single
case of a severe sepsis add up to €25,000 [28]. Only con-
sidering the rate of sepsis in very low birth neonates in our
hospital the reduction from 2004 (46 %) to 2005 (11 %)
underline the cost effectiveness.
As a result of these aspects the costs of the POU filters as
an essential element of the preventive measures in high
risk areas are more than justified even under economic
considerations.
The next step is the definition of extended limiting values
according to a risk assessment. Therefore we introducedBMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Measures executed for preventive and reasons of decontamination over the period from 2004 till 2006 (surveillance of IHEM) Figure 5
Measures executed for preventive and reasons of decontamination over the period from 2004 till 2006 (surveillance of IHEM). 
A = Immediate re-inspection; B = Re-inspection within 7 days; C = Re-inspection within 14 days; D = Re-inspection without 
POU filter; E = Re-inspection/processing of aerators; F = Flushing; G = ClO2-decontamination; H = Installation of POU filter; I 
= POU reversal; K = POU remains; L = Heating up; M = Closure of tap
the so-called warning, alert and worst case value. Espe-
cially the warning value is considered under aspects of pri-
mary prevention as one of the central requests on the
WSP. The long term effect of this sub-set limit value is the
avoidance of nosocomial infections. The alert and worst
case values were established regarding to accidental and
even situations of bioterrorism where immediate and
more than ever efficient measures have to be predeter-
mined.
In progression of the three years there is a trend from
many re-inspections, flushing of the water system and
installation of additional POU filters to heating up – even
if only small amounts of Legionella spp. occur – and
processing of aerators, as a reaction to a local contamina-
tion.
Summarizing all mentioned premises the WSP adapts the
principles of primary prevention especially regarding to
ethical aspects, in contrast to perform measures only as a
response to increased quantities of nosocomial infections
or even severe outbreaks. Impressive is the difference
between 2004 and 2005, when the WSP and its defined
measures were fully put into action with an awesome suc-
cess compared to the outcome of former procedures.
To enforce basical ideas of WSP in developing countries
for immunocompromised patients as well we suggest the
following measures: boiled water for drinking and food
preparation, use of medical devices (e.g. nebulizers),
wound care especially burns no showering, no curtains for
showers [29]. If boiling is not possible, sun exposition of
water in plastic bottles has disinfecting effects [30].BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Results of examinations for heterotrophic plate counts/ml in the three risk areas (DHC 2005) Figure 6
Results of examinations for heterotrophic plate counts/ml in the three risk areas (DHC 2005).
Conclusion
After the implementation of the WSP in all parts of the
hospital the number of transgressions decreased continu-
ously. Another argument for the efficacy of the WSP is the
fact that there was no case of nosocomial Legionnaires'
disease since the year 2004 although the institute of
microbiology screened each case of pneumonia for
Legionella.
The WSP offers the possibility starting measures in case of
a contamination immediately by using previously defined
actions according to a risk assessment. The advantage of a
central recording and assessment of all results referring to
the water quality combined with the possibility of a proc-
ess control is an unalienable part around the efforts of the
water safety plan. Beside the ethical aspect a WSP is cost
effective.
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Results of examinations for Coli-like resp Figure 7
Results of examinations for Coli-like resp. E. coli in the three risk areas (DHC 2005).BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Results of examinations for Pseudomonas spp. in the three risk areas (DHC 2005) Figure 8
Results of examinations for Pseudomonas spp. in the three risk areas (DHC 2005).BMC Public Health 2007, 7:34 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/34
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Results of examinations for Legionella spp. in the three risk areas (DHC 2005) Figure 9
Results of examinations for Legionella spp. in the three risk areas (DHC 2005).
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